The signing of the “Chinese directive” by the Head of State literally just before the US President Donald Trump’s official visit to Beijing gave reason to reflect on the potential impact of the outcome of the negotiations in the context of the national interests of Belarus.
The meeting between the two leaders is taking place against the backdrop of a fragmented international system, including conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, intense trade and technological competition, and a renewed nuclear arms race. However, with the administration of Trump 2.0, China is demonstrating much greater confidence and pragmatism, risk tolerance, and a willingness to manage escalation. The structural economic interdependence of the countries suggests that Beijing is determined to talk tough in order to strengthen its strategic immunity. Based on their experience in countering tariff wars and sanctions, they are already actively defending their economy.
For example, recently the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China launched retaliatory investigations against US actions in the area of its allegedly excessive production capacities. For the first time, rules have been tested to counter the unreasonable extraterritorial application of foreign legislation, ordering Chinese companies to ignore US sanctions related to Iranian oil.
Meta’s purchase of Chinese artificial intelligence startup Manus, operating in Singapore, has been blocked. These and other cases reflect the growing confidence of the Chinese leadership. The prospect of a trade deal with the United States does not prevent them from defending their strategic interests. Beijing maneuvers flexibly in the negotiation agenda without fear of a breakdown in relations. This is a radical change in approach compared to their previous position, when they tacitly submitted to sanctions.
China places increased levels of innovation, industrial sustainability and supply chains as key pillars of its strategic immunity. Technological self-sufficiency has always been a priority. However, competition with the United States has heightened the sense in Beijing of the need to build up its innovation capacity. Over time, the discourse has shifted from self-sufficiency to a desire for dominance and leadership in “original and disruptive innovation” in fundamental and cutting-edge areas.
The resilience of supply chains, especially in the face of external instability and coercion, is seen as a critical factor in ensuring a country’s international competitiveness and national security. Within the new five-year plan, these issues are given priority attention. The government is calling for “extraordinary measures to achieve decisive breakthroughs in key core technologies.” In April, the State Council passed a series of laws that empower relevant departments to take retaliatory measures against sources of perceived threats and risks. From Beijing’s point of view, regardless of the administration in the White House, the project of strategic containment of the PRC enjoys bipartisan support in the United States. So Chinese leaders expect continued competition, and are tightening their grip on critical technologies, industries and supply chains.
Whatever the results of the negotiations in Beijing, they undoubtedly set the basic contours of the global economy and the future world order. Based on current trends and bilateral dynamics over the past six months, China is clearly in a strong position at the negotiating table. The “Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily)” newspaper (the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) clearly emphasized this issue in advance. It was highlighted that China-US relations cannot go back to the past, but they can have a better future. The dialogue has become more equal and pragmatic, and the main positions have become clearer, demonstrating the possibility of a new chapter. China is not challenging America or seeking to replace it. At the same time, the desire to protect its legitimate rights and interests remains unshakable.
By chance or consistently, the Chinese and American negotiations in Beijing coincided with the holding of a meeting of BRICS foreign ministers in New Delhi on the same days, where, among others, technological partnership, digital innovation, and issues of energy and food security were also discussed. It should be taken into account that shortly after the Trump-Xi summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit China, as a result of which no less fateful decisions for the world should be expected.
Based on the totality of the episodes presented, the key conclusion is that in the context of a global geopolitical and geo-economic reassembly of the world, Minsk’s priority should be to diversify and strengthen partnerships with all key players to increase strategic flexibility and sustainability. To do this, it is important to continue to counteract sanctions (up to their lifting), build up domestic potential in sectors of critical technologies, and also improve applied mechanisms for control over industrial, logistics and financial chains, including in the SCO and BRICS formats.
With regard to China, all these measures in one form or another are provided for in the above-mentioned directive, which was designed to help increase the dynamics and volume of Belarusian and Chinese interaction with an emphasis on deepening industrial and technological cooperation, as well as the further development of trade, investment and innovation spheres. At the same time, foreign expert assessments recorded by BISR indicate the presence of a stable trend – the pragmatization of Beijing’s approaches in relations even with ideologically close strategic partners. This innovation will require qualitatively new approaches to the practical implementation of the document described.