In a recent interview with BELTA on the occasion of Republic Day, the Ambassador of India to Belarus Ashok Kumar signally focused several times on the importance of finding new directions for increasing mutual trade. While meeting with a diplomat in November 2025, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko outlined the target of 2-3 billion dollars per year. The head of state has repeatedly stated his desire to bring bilateral cooperation to the level of strategic partnership. Where to look for novelty and what should be the basis of strategic partnership?
Let’s try to figure it out using the example of the India-EU Free Trade Area (FTA) agreement concluded upon after 19 years of negotiations, which has already been named “the mother of all agreements.” Once in force, it will create a market with a combined population of about two billion people and coverage of up to a quarter of global GDP. The obvious geopolitical implication is to be on the safe side against tariff wars and unpredictability, coming primarily from the United States. In addition, this is an opportunity for Brussels to balance economic ties with China and the United States and strengthen its position in one of the fastest growing economies in the world. For New Delhi, the agreement promises increased access to new markets and an influx of investment amidst ongoing tensions with the White House. Prime Minister Narendra Modi believes that the new quality of cooperation with the EU will help stabilize the global order.
Diversification of foreign trade has become a critical element of India’s national strategy to become a developed country by 2047, especially under conditions of tariff pressure. However, the country’s experience with FTAs is not so clear. From 2017 to 2022, exports under such agreements grew by about 31%, while imports grew by more than 80%, significantly widening the trade deficit. Their utilization rate in India is approximately 25% compared to 70-80% in developed countries. This explains New Delhi’s caution and reluctance to view such deals as strategic decisions only. This aspect should be kept in mind both in the context of the bilateral negotiation track and in the India-EAEU format.
New Delhi believes that the key to the success of any FTA is institutional functionality. Therefore, in addition to a formal governing council, the Indian side proposes the EU to create a joint supervisory forum: a permanent body with the authority to identify ineffective sectors and promptly readjust regulatory procedures.
Over the past decade, ties between the EU and India have strengthened with cooperation scaling up in the areas of climate (climate financial support), energy (including green energy), urban development (digital public infrastructure) and security. Agreements on semiconductors (the country is preparing to launch its own commercial production), critical minerals and telecommunications bring the parties even closer to the common goal of reducing external risks. This happened despite the obvious asymmetry of strategic priorities and foreign policy interests.
Technology and sustainable development are becoming the key drivers of interaction. Partnerships in these sectors are critical to India’s energy transition, including nonpolluting hydrogen, electric mobility and climate-resilient urban infrastructure. This cooperation is linked to the industrial strategy and long-term energy security of the country. French President Emmanuel Macron’s February visit to New Delhi to attend the global India-AI Impact Summit aims to highlight the EU’s growing engagement with India on new technologies and their impact on sustainable development.
However, there are exceptions to the deal: agriculture and dairy are left out of the equation. The most sensitive topics for India are cars and alcohol; and for the EU it is an access to services and standards.
In the context of the interests of Belarus, the following fundamental point deserves attention first of all.
India’s positioning as a future global hub for manufacturing, technology and defense means that the content of strategic relationships is no longer based primarily on simple trade and investment. This is why there is increasingly a clear shift away from the buyer-seller model that has long dominated in trade with Europe. This trend was also confirmed following V. Putin’s December visit to New Delhi.
India places a strategic emphasis on long-term joint development and industrial production with technology transfer. This fully applies to the military-technical sector. It should be noted that Indian defense-tech startups are recording an unprecedented growth in government contracts along with a focus on technological sovereignty and localization of defense production. It is supported by both direct government procurements and the expansion of testing programs and pilot projects. Experts note that for many of them, the defense sector is becoming a key driver for scaling businesses.
An important area of interaction between India and the EU is medicine and pharmaceuticals. A future FTA could potentially reduce healthcare costs and allow for the wider introduction of advanced technologies, which will ultimately make medicine more accessible and improve its quality.
Another interesting development is the creation of the Forum of Company Leaders. This initiative is designed to engage business leaders in government-level discussions on trade and investment issues and illustrates an attempt to align government strategy with private sector opportunities.
Systemic contacts in the humanitarian sphere are called upon to strengthen the basis of the India-EU strategic partnership, including simplification of visa regime, cultural, scientific and educational exchanges, tourism, orderly labor migration — the traditional tools of Indian soft power.
Therefore, the formula for reinvigorating India-EU relations is based on a convergence of strategic concerns and economic interests that encourage closer coordination.
To create a solid economic and political base for reaching the level of strategic partnership, it is necessary to radically change the usual inertial focus on interaction with India, which involves, among other things, a comprehensive and careful consideration of its concerns about sovereignty, threat perception, strategic priorities and pressing internal needs.
From the above analysis it is obvious: there are no quick, linear and universal recipes for increasing the dynamics and volumes of mutual trade with India, and Brussels’ trade deal with New Delhi (especially its timing) is proof of this.
India is primarily interested in commodity and financially intensive sales markets and investments for its leader development programs. In this sense, Belarus is not a priority: in terms of population, our country can be compared with their one average metropolis. The Indian market is very competitive and protective. The backbone of the corporate sector is private business, which does not allow one to count on significant assistance from the authorities in its development. The main issue here is the ability of Belarusian exporting enterprises themselves to multiply the volume of production of commodities adapted to the demanding needs of an Indian consumer, which vary radically from region to region. Our readiness to actually invest financially in projects for the localization of specific production facilities in India with a clear understanding of our strategy and the associated risks seems to be a fundamentally important issue.