Article from the collection "International Standards and Electoral Process: Experience and Development Prospects. International Research Conference. Minsk, September 19-20, 2024", Minsk, 2025
When characterizing technologies of external intervention, researchers, as a rule, pay more attention to their visible manifestations and consequences, as well as to new aspects. In fact, modern scientific literature describes in sufficient detail the mechanics and effects of technologies of information impact on the individual, society, and the state, including network forms of impact.
The specifics of manipulative technologies, in particular, are described in details in works of the Russian A. Manoilo, G. Pocheptsov, I. Ashmanov, I. Nezhdanov, M. Makstenek, P. Frolova, R. Nurullov, A. Udotova et al.) and Belarusian (V. Gigin, N. Buzin, I. Marzalyuk, S. Kizima, D. Rotman, S. Musienko, and others) scientists.
The present stage widely studies the legal side of the issue of external intervention in internal affairs of a state and directions for improving international legal mechanisms of liability for encroachment on the sovereignty of states being objects of interference [1]. Special attention should be paid to the study of the phenomenon of "color revolutions" as a natural result of external impact society and the state, changing the internal state of the social system [2]. At the same time, the focus of research on foreign influence on internal processes in target states is largely directed towards election technologies, which is in many ways justified, since it is the electoral periods that provide a window of opportunity for various forces in the struggle for power. An important area of research on intervention technologies is the analysis of the impact of digital tools and digitalization in principle on society [3].
The study of intervention processes is often reflective in nature, which is reflected in the analysis of events and phenomena that have already occurred. At the same time, deeper understanding of the driving forces and essence of external intervention, as well as the development of effective protective mechanisms against anti-state crimes require algorithms for modeling processes and situations that create relevant risks for the countries under study. Important are the markers and prerequisites that indicate an increased vulnerability of various aspects of public life to external influences and destabilization attempts.
In this context, the intervention factors (cause-effect side) and mechanisms (activity side) deserve special attention.
Intervention factors are conditions, circumstances or variables that determine the possibility of foreign countries interfering in domestic political processes.
Intervention mechanisms are a sequence of events or processes that explain how intervention factors interact and lead to a certain result – protests, armed confrontation, or, vice versa, compromises.
Both factors and mechanisms can be of both external and internal nature. Therefore, intervention has four main dimensions:
1) external and 2) internal factors; 3) external and 4) internal mechanisms.
The history of attempts at “velvet” and “color” revolutions, studied in detail by scholars and publicists in the broadest possible geographical, civilizational and temporal context, provides a meaningful empirical basis for identifying universal patterns of intervention. The analysis of political processes that took place in many countries of the world in different periods (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Portugal, France, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Libya, Egypt, Russia (2011), Belarus (2020), Hong Kong, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, etc.) essentially provides an opportunity to form a detailed “chronicle of intervention” for subsequent learning and risk forecasts for any of the countries of the world.
Having considered only individual characteristic, but at the same time not much identical “cases” (viz. Ukraine from the “Orange Revolution” to the “Euromaidan”; the “Bulldozer Revolution” in Serbia in 2000; the Syrian crisis of 2011, the period of the collapse of the Eastern European bloc in 1989; protests in France in 1968, Hong Kong in 2019), the following universal markers and patterns of intervention in the internal affairs of states were identified based on the four dimensions listed.
External factors of intervention:
- civilizational – the presence of the will of the world power centers to change the political thinking of peoples of specific countries and regions in order to spread their influence in them or weaken competing civilizations (Russia, China);
- ideological – the struggle of systems of views on the world order and social structure, the strengthening or weakening of the influence of one or another system of values. For example, degradation of the Soviet ideology, the discrepancy between the declared and the real, as well as the destruction of the ideological basis as a result of Gorbachev’s reforms in the USSR (Gorbachev’s refusal to use Soviet troops stationed in the Central and Eastern European countries to stabilize the regimes) resulted in disorientation in the Eastern Bloc countries [4];
- pseudo-ideological – popularization of the consumer society mentality, dissemination of cosmopolitan views on the world order, justification of intervention in elections abroad “ for a very good cause and in the interests of democracy” (quote from former CIA Director J. Woolsey) [5];
- doctrinal – the presence of plans and strategies to influence a country or region (the American project to destabilize the Middle East through a strategy of "constructive chaos" – using local discontent to achieve fragmentation of society and regime change);
- confrontational – cultivation by the intervention initiators in the public thinking of the peoples of the target countries of the enemy image in the person of the main civilizational antagonist (Russia, the USSR). A typical example is the impact on Ukrainian society during the inter-Maidan period (2004-2014);
- military-political – the decision of the subjects of intervention to conduct military operations that directly or indirectly affect the interests of the objects. For example, the US war in Vietnam intensified political differences in France over the future of the French colonies, provoking protests in 1968 [6]. The escalation of internal political processes in Serbia in 2000 increased significantly after the US administration began seriously considering removing S. Milosevic from power and preparing for war against Serbia. Tensions between the US and China, and the shift of the center of global contradictions to the Middle East led to subsequent attempts to interfere in the internal political life of Syria [7];
- economic – events and processes that directly affect the economic well-being of the target countries. For example, the collapse in oil prices, provoked by Saudi Arabia after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, weakened the economic potential of the USSR in the countries of Eastern Europe [4].
Internal factors of intervention:
- ideological and political - the ideological crisis and desacralization of authorities, the emergence of a "new sacredness" (change of names, monuments), the presence of a layer of internal comprador forces who want to introduce a system of external governance under a plausible pretext (justice, democracy, etc.) (typical for Ukraine during the Euromaidan period) [8];
- olitical and infrastructural – the formation of an alternative political and ideological infrastructure, including the creation of leaderless movements through "network marketing" technologies, the emergence of giant golem-like parties (as seen in Serbia on the eve of the "Bulldozer Revolution"), and the transformation of marginal structures into mass movements perceived as forces fighting "for the common good" (e.g., the Serbian movement "Otpor").
- state and administrative – the underestimation and neglect of the development of destructive processes by security and law enforcement agencies, making erroneous decisions, “political bargaining” with opponents (the very fact of negotiations between heads of state and protest leaders in Ukraine actually ensured the subjectivity of the Maidan, reducing the authority of official authorities) [8], the lack of a clear state course (e.g., the increase in contradictions between the socialist economy and liberalization in Eastern European countries);
- socio-economic – significant problems in the functioning of the economy, growing social discontent, natural disasters affecting harvests and food security (for example, drought contributed to socio-economic difficulties in Syria), and the inefficient distribution of benefits. For example, in Eastern European countries, there was "wage equalization at enterprises that used both new and old equipment, and the freezing of salaries of the "intellectual clan", which gradually moved into the internal fronde" [4];
- information technology - the shaping of anti-government public sentiment through propaganda, the use of advanced tools for spreading viral content and crowd control (for example, in Hong Kong, alongside Telegram, the FireChat app was actively used, enabling communication even in the absence of mobile networks or Internet access [9]); the creation of a positive image for new types of movements, presenting them as “giving hope for changes”;
- ethno-confessional – the presence of tensions along religious and/or ethnic minority lines; local socio-political, ethnic, religious, and economic diversity used as a basis for manipulating the sentiments of specific groups; the revival of nationalist myths and the transformation of nationalists into public opinion leaders;
- demographic – rapid and profound societal transformation (the mass exodus of the population from rural areas and the influx of huge numbers of people into factory work), and the emergence of a labor movement formed by yesterday’s peasants;
- socio-psychological – societal “fatigue” from stagnation and political monotony, and the emergence of a “protest fashion” among students (a cultural and historical trend);
- generational – a high propensity among youth toward extremism, a “generation gap,” and the unfulfilled social roles and aspirations of young individuals, leading them to reject (or ignore) conventional norms of life, behavior, and law, and to adhere to radical trends.
External mechanism of interventions:
- the development of resource centers and NGOs, their implementation of purposeful policies towards target countries: personnel selection, financing of loyal political infrastructure, conducting trainings and seminars, promotion of values (for example, the cultivation of the triplicity of principles "West - market – liberal values" conducted by the Soros Foundation network), bribery of politicians and intellectuals;
- voyages of famous political figures (for example, Bernard-Henri Lévy's trip to Yugoslavia, Georgia, Ukraine);
- destruction of traditions through "cultural institutions" – movies, music, "free lifestyle";
- "controlled chaos" mechanisms (according to A. Manoilo) – the destruction of traditional structure of social order through the “atomization” of society, the severing of ties between individuals and the community, and the introduction of surrogate individualism into the public mindset [10];
- direct management of the internal political forces of the target countries (for example, negotiations between the American administration and the leaders of Serbia's divided opposition to persuade them to compromise and create a "united political front" [11]);
- informational – establishing external domination over the media and social communication channels, targeted massive informational and psychological impact on all segments of the population, disinformation, demoralization of national elites, corruption "revelations", creation of a negative image of the current government in global public opinion, discrediting the state media, as well as the entire political, law enforcement, judicial system of the state;
- military force - for example, NATO aggression against Yugoslavia as the «apex» of a unipolar world [12];
- economic and military control by interventionists (for example, forcing Eastern European countries to join NATO, gaining control over enterprises in these countries);
- the introduction of economic and personal sanctions and restrictions;
- support for extremist religious groups. For example, for several years, money and weapons have been flowing from the Persian Gulf countries to Salafist mosques to train networks of Islamist activists in Syria; mercenaries from 120 countries have flocked to Syria to create an "Islamic civilization" [5];
- cultivation, including financial support, of nationalism;
- involvement of young individuals (groups) in destructive political activity - stimulation of interest in radical ideas and concepts, formation of radical subcultures, including network communities, based on the association of like-minded people, etc.
Internal mechanisms of intervention:
- the emergence of an internal political infrastructure – parties, mass media, intellectual associations;
- self-organization of combat troops under the guise of military-patriotic education camps (especially on the eve of the "second Maidan" in Ukraine in 2012-2013);
- activation of social media and bloggers, labeling and discrediting the government ("authorites beat up students, almost kids," etc.);
- formation of a united "democratic" opposition (for example, in Serbia there are more than 20 political parties and public associations led by the Otpor movement);
- participation of citizens in preparation and dissemination of fake news (“chemical attacks”, “atrocities” against peaceful demonstrators, etc.);
- irrational political decisions (e.g., the decision of the Hungarian Socialist Party to open the borders and allow free flight to Austria in 1989, which provoked a wave of refugees through Hungary);
- co-organization of large masses of people, as a rule, the youth audience of social networks, the glorification of "leaders of change" and "victims of the arbitrariness of the authorities", demands for lustration, reprivatization, and criminal prosecution of well-known political figures [13];
- direct actions by forces loyal to external actors to destabilize the situation (street actions, demolition of monuments, rumors about the deaths of demonstrators);
- the maturation of non–criminal destructive political activity of young people - manifestations of discontent (disagreement) about certain actions (decisions) of the state that are not formally prohibited by law.
The said factors and mechanisms of external intervention are not exhaustive, but they may be quite sufficient for modeling risk scenarios for specific countries. At the same time, external factors and mechanisms will be present to various degree in almost every case due to the permanence of inter-civilizational confrontation and the availability of a fairly wide arsenal of means (military, economic, informational, etc.) to influence certain social strata of the target countries.
Internal factors and mechanisms during periods of stability are less pronounced (or latent). At the same time, they are more accessible for research and development of measures for their localization.
Special attention should be paid to the pre-electoral processes, in the course of which the degree of intensity of external intervention is most clearly manifested, which makes it possible to predict the severity of political threats during the campaign itself. In fact, if there are clear signs of intervention in all four dimensions on the eve of the election campaign, the situation requires urgent measures to ensure the protection of electoral sovereignty.
From the viewpoint of external intervention factors, Belarus is in a continuous risk zone due to both its geographical location and its civilizational choice. By consistently strengthening international subjectivity through participation in such progressive blocs as the SCO and BRICS, and developing allied relations with Russia within the framework of the Union State and the EAEU countries, our country is experiencing both ideological and ideological, economic, and military-political external intervention factors. At the same time, the severity of internal factors and mechanisms may vary from time to time. The transformation of political, legal, social and informational aspects of life realized in 2020 - 2024 made it possible to significantly minimize and in some cases localize such manifestations as the activities of NGOs controlled by foreign foundations, the formation of alternative political infrastructure, and the involvement of citizens, especially young people, in destructive activities.
Given the explosive development of external intervention technologies (the constant transformation of the sanctions mechanism, terrorist and extremist threats, the use of new technologies of information influence, including AI-based, etc.), for Belarusian society, cohesion, prevention of atomization, the presence of clear national development goals and the active desire of society to achieve them are more important than ever. These and many other processes still need to be built, filled with real content, and made irreversible, and this is our most important common task for the years to come.