The outcomes of the annual 23rd Russia–India supreme summit in New Delhi, in addition to the signals the leaders sent to external actors (given the complex geopolitical dynamics) and to their domestic audiences, effectively outlined the contours of a plan whose implementation is expected to bring bilateral trade to the targeted level of USD 100 billion by 2030. By the end of the current year, trade is projected to remain close to last year’s figures – approximately USD 65 billion. In other words, trade must increase one-and-a-half times within five years.
The special protocol of the meeting (N. Modi personally greeting V. Putin at the aircraft stairway, travelling together in one car), the impressive size and seniority of the official and business delegations, the 70-point joint statement, and the roughly 30 documents signed all underscored the significance of the event, as well as the role of leader-level diplomacy as a guarantee of delivering on the ambitious plans set out.
According to experts, the main outcome of the summit is the attempt by Moscow and New Delhi to develop a model of cooperation protected from external influence, going beyond arms and energy trade, and strengthening the technological component in new sectors (nuclear energy, civil aviation, the automotive industry, shipbuilding and ship repair, logistics, unmanned technologies, critical minerals, and labour migration). At the same time, defence and security remain a key component of the strategic partnership, despite India’s diversification of its sources of weapons and its emphasis on domestic production. The focus has shifted towards joint research and development, technology transfer, and deep localisation of advanced systems in line with the “Make in India” programme.
Judging from the leaders’ rhetoric, it can be assumed that India will continue to purchase Russian oil even through more complex workaround schemes, despite the threat of US secondary sanctions, thereby demonstrating strategic autonomy and its commitment to partnership with Russia. It is evident that N. Modi believes India’s economic strength and weight in global affairs provide the room for manoeuvre needed to raise the stakes.
The pause regarding the future of Russian oil imports, the need to address the trade imbalance, and US tariffs allow New Delhi to markedly increase its exports to Russia, particularly in agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, and electronics. Small and medium-sized enterprises are expected to play a key role in diversifying the trade basket. In India, three-quarters of companies employ fewer than 40 people, and only 14% have between 31 and 99 employees.
India will participate in Russian projects in the Arctic and the Far East, including in the exploration and extraction of critical minerals. Bottlenecks in logistics are expected to be “unblocked” by developing the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor and linking the North–South Transport Corridor with the Chennai–Vladivostok maritime route. Plans include creating shipbuilding and ship repair clusters with Russian participation in the ports of Mumbai and Chennai, jointly constructing non-nuclear icebreakers, and cooperating on the training of Arctic crews and scientific activities.
To ensure the staffing of future joint projects, Russia is placing emphasis on attracting labour from India, against the backdrop of a projected shortage of 3 million workers by 2030 (a corresponding agreement has been signed). The Russian Education Agency’s branch in New Delhi will promote opportunities for study and employment in Russia.
In line with plans to increase trade volumes, the presence of Russian banks in India is expanding. A Gazprombank branch already operates there (with an application submitted to open a second one), along with the representative offices of Sberbank and VTB – the first bank to enter the Indian market 20 years ago and now opening a second office in New Delhi with a focus on digital solutions. On the eve of V. Putin’s visit, the Bank of Russia opened a representative office in Mumbai (its second abroad after China). Alfa-Bank is pursuing similar plans.
Particular attention has been paid to the information support of expanding ties. In the Indian capital, RT India has begun broadcasting from its own studio. Five of the 29 signed memoranda relate specifically to cooperation in the media sphere. Moscow has endorsed New Delhi’s initiative to establish and host, under the SCO’s auspices, a Forum of Civilisations, whose inauguration will take place in India in 2026. The symbolic nature of N. Modi’s gift to V. Putin – a Russian-language edition of the ancient Indian epic Bhagavad Gita (“The Song of God”) – also stands out. It is one of the most renowned and revered texts of Indian philosophy, and it is widely accepted that without studying it, a profound understanding of India’s cultural code is impossible – a hint that is more than transparent.
It is encouraging that the leaders’ statement noted increased exchanges and contacts between experts and analytical centres of the two countries. It emphasised that for many years this dialogue has helped deepen mutual understanding among strategic and political circles, as well as the business community. Notably, on the eve of the summit, experts from an Indian think-tank close to the National Security Council proposed initiating strategic bilateral “Track II” dialogues on security issues in Eurasia and the Arctic.
What parallels and conclusions can be drawn in relation to the Belarus–India agenda?
In November 2025, during a meeting with India’s Ambassador Ashok Kumar, the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko also set a new target for bilateral trade with India – USD 2–3 billion per year. This means that, given the long-standing average of around USD 600 million (based on available statistics) and the dominance of potash fertilisers in Belarusian exports (up to 80% in some years), trade must increase by a factor of 3.5–5.
The seriousness and ambition of this goal clearly make the outcomes of the 23rd Putin–Modi summit a kind of “guideline” for Belarus in terms of studying (and possibly adopting) shared approaches, synchronising priorities, strengthening adaptability, and responding more attentively to the needs and requests of partners, including regarding conditions and limits of reciprocal market access. Undoubtedly, within the Russia–India agenda, closer examination will reveal niches where Belarusian interests could be integrated, for example in investment projects in the Far East and the Arctic.
At the same time, it appears that a multiple increase in trade with India, given its current base and its dependence on raw materials (as in the case of Russia), will require a non-standard, non-linear strategy. Such a strategy must be built on initial answers to the following important questions:
• is Belarusian industry capable (and willing) to rapidly and substantially increase and adapt production volumes of export goods to meet the specific needs and requests of the Indian market? And this is despite the fact that experts say that such a concept as an “Indian market” does not exist in nature – there are markets in individual regions of the country;
• to what extent do we understand the preferences of different categories of Indian consumers, including across specific product groups and regions (states)?
• how relevant and competitive is Belarusian industrial output in India today, and which products in particular?
• is there demand and capacity among Belarus’s small and medium-sized businesses to trade more actively with India and to invest in the country?
• which Indian imports are most attractive for Belarus, in what volumes, and to what extent is Belarus prepared to open its market?
It is evident that the President’s goal can be achieved only through the consolidation of efforts – by the state, exporting enterprises, export support agencies, the banking sector, logistics operators, private businesses, and the expert community.