Most commentators from expert and media circles agree that the 25th SCO Summit, held from August 31 to September 1, reaffirmed China’s intention to gradually transform the organization into a genuine center of gravity for Eurasian diplomacy, multipolarity, and technology. This opinion was shared with a BELTA correspondent by Yury Yarmolinsky, Analyst at the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research (BISR), Head of the Center for SCO and BRICS Studies.
“The format, scale, and media coverage of the event, as well as the new initiative on Global Governance (in addition to the earlier ones on development, security, and civilization), reflect Beijing’s consistent intention to steadily enhance the SCO’s role in international politics — including as a counterbalance to Western institutions,” Yarmolinsky noted.
The analyst pointed out that India demonstrated pragmatism and strategic autonomy at the summit: its participation in the forum was harmoniously combined with efforts to secure guarantees and explore new opportunities in security and economic cooperation with China. “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposal to establish a Forum for Dialogue of Civilizations highlights New Delhi’s consistent commitment to soft power,” he said. “The similarity between this concept and China’s Global Civilization Initiative reflects a readiness for constructive dialogue and further normalization of relations with its eastern neighbor. At the same time, the ‘red lines’ remain clearly defined — territorial integrity and sovereignty, relations with Pakistan. It should be noted that India’s participation makes the SCO a more inclusive platform and mitigates the risks of unilateral dominance.”
At the same time, interaction between the two countries, as before, is objectively interwoven with competition and rivalry in the region. Differences in national priorities and interests persist. The summit provided both New Delhi and Beijing with a comfortable venue to “reset” relations and improve the climate of strategic trust — yet it did not eliminate their fundamental contradictions, Yarmolinsky believes.
Furthermore, the Central Asian states — particularly Kazakhstan — view the SCO as a source of investment and a convenient coordination platform. Therefore, they support and initiate the creation of specialized centers focused on security, water resources, and artificial intelligence. “At the same time, the countries of the region act pragmatically and cautiously: they primarily seek tangible economic benefits and aim to strengthen their role in Eurasian politics, including by balancing interests with other power centers beyond the organization’s framework,” the analyst emphasized.
He also added that the full-scale institutional restructuring of the SCO is still facing certain constraints. The practical implementation of the adopted strategic documents — Strategy 2035, roadmaps on AI, the establishment of a Development Bank, and security centers — requires financial resources, legal mechanisms, a unified payment infrastructure, and sustainable political consensus among member states.
“The SCO’s economic framework remains exposed to sanctions risks. This is particularly critical for projects dependent on international financing. For sanctioned states, SCO membership provides a ‘political umbrella’ but does not automatically guarantee access to capital and technology — which puts the issue of developing an internal system of technology and capital transfer within the organization on the agenda. Although the process of de-dollarization and national currency settlements is gradually advancing, without a unified multipolar payment system the effect will remain fragmented,” Yarmolinsky said.
Thus, according to the analyst, the 25th SCO Summit in Tianjin reaffirmed the organization’s political and symbolic status as an important pole and multilateral forum for Eurasian diplomacy — a promotional platform for showcasing alternative models of global governance — and gave new impetus to expanding its multilateral agenda. “However, real economic and institutional innovations will continue to stall until supranational financing mechanisms, multilateral flagship projects, a unified payment infrastructure, and greater mutual trust appear,” the expert stressed.
Based on these conclusions and his own assessment of the summit’s results, the analyst proposed three possible scenarios for the SCO’s further development. The first — conservative — scenario is likely in the short term. It assumes that the SCO will, for the time being, remain primarily a dialogical and coordinating multilateral platform, a convenient venue for synchronizing bilateral tracks. Separate joint projects will be launched within the organization’s framework, but a rapid creation of a full-fledged payment and financial architecture is unlikely.
The second — pragmatically moderate — scenario appears realistic in the medium term. “This scenario is based on the assumption that the Development Bank will begin partial operation, stimulating new joint infrastructure projects, primarily in Central Asia — the SCO’s geographic core. On the basis of consensus among key member states, a financing mechanism will be launched, mainly with the participation of China and Russia,” the analyst suggested.
The third — ambitious and transformational — scenario has a low probability without major geopolitical shifts. “In this case, the SCO evolves into an effective alternative to Western financial institutions: the Development Bank operates efficiently with clear rules for financing and capital attraction, a multilateral payment mechanism in national currencies is in place, and technological cooperation is closely coordinated. Major contradictions among member states are reduced to an optimal level. Bilateral agreements and projects emerge between India, China, and Russia in finance, trade, logistics, and security — and these are integrated into the SCO’s institutional framework. As a result, the organization’s institutional capacity and influence in Eurasia and globally increase significantly (with China playing a key role). Alternative models of development and technology transfer are promoted, joint R&D centers are established, and the level and depth of military-political coordination rise. Functional energy and logistics chains emerge outside Western disruptions,” Yarmolinsky explained.
“Which of these expert scenarios proves the most realistic and viable will be shown by time. The above-mentioned bottlenecks are, without doubt, growth challenges. From a historical perspective, 25 years (the SCO anniversary to be marked in 2026) is only the beginning of a long journey for such a new-type international organization. It is essential to continue strengthening the Eurasian linkage — or the “Shanghai Spirit”, as the SCO Charter defines it. In practical terms, our main task remains the implementation of the “Strategy for the Participation of the Republic of Belarus in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, approved by the Head of State in early 2025,” the analyst concluded.